# Household Problem

Juergen Jung<sup>\*</sup> Department of Economics Towson University

March 28, 2017

#### Abstract

This is a simple household problem in a one period economy.

<sup>\*</sup>Department of Economics, Towson University, U.S.A., E-mail: jjung@towson.edu

### 1 Household Problem with 2 Goods

Household preferences are gives as

$$u(c_1, c_2) = \frac{c_1^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \frac{c_2^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$

The budget constraint is

 $p_1c_1 + p_2c_2 = I,$ 

where income I is exogenously given (endowment income).

#### 1.1 Budget Constraint

If you want to draw the budget constraint you can reformulate the budget constraint as

$$c_2 = \underbrace{\overbrace{I}}^{\text{Intercept slope}}_{p_2} - \underbrace{\overbrace{p_1}}^{p_1} c_1.$$

The extreme consumption points, where the budget constraint crosses the axes are:

$$c_1 = 0 \rightarrow c_2 = \frac{I}{p_2},$$
  
$$c_2 = 0 \rightarrow c_1 = \frac{I}{p_1}.$$

Draw this budget constraint with quantities of  $c_1$  on the horizontal axis and quantities of  $c_2$  on the vertical axis.

#### 1.2 Household Maximization Problem

The household maximization problem is:

$$max_{\{c_1,c_2\}} \left\{ \frac{c_1^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \frac{c_2^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} \right\}$$
  
s.t.  
$$p_1c_1 + p_2c_2 = I.$$

The optimality condition of the household is

$$MRS \equiv \frac{MU_{c_1}}{MU_{c_2}} = \frac{p_1}{p_2},$$

where  $MU_{c_1} = \frac{\partial u(c_1,c_2)}{\partial c_1}$  is the marginal utility w.r.t.  $c_1$  and  $MU_{c_2} = \frac{\partial u(c_1,c_2)}{\partial c_2}$ . With the functional form given above the MRS becomes:

$$MU_{c_1} = \frac{\partial u(c_1, c_2)}{\partial c_1} = (1 - \sigma) \frac{c_1^{1 - \sigma - 1}}{(1 - \sigma)} = c_1^{-\sigma},$$
  
$$MU_{c_2} = \frac{\partial u(c_1, c_2)}{\partial c_2} = (1 - \sigma) \frac{c_2^{1 - \sigma - 1}}{(1 - \sigma)} = c_2^{-\sigma},$$

 $\quad \text{and} \quad$ 

$$MRS = \frac{c_1^{-\sigma}}{c_2^{-\sigma}} = \frac{c_2^{\sigma}}{c_1^{\sigma}} = \left(\frac{c_2}{c_1}\right)^{\sigma}.$$

The optimality condition says that this has to be equal to the price ratio so that

$$\left(\frac{c_2}{c_1}\right)^{\sigma} = \frac{p_1}{p_2}.$$

We can now express  $c_2$  as a function of  $c_1$  and prices

$$\left(\frac{c_2}{c_1}\right)^{\sigma} = \frac{p_1}{p_2},$$
  

$$\rightarrow \left(\left(\frac{c_2}{c_1}\right)^{\sigma}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \left(\frac{p_1}{p_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}},$$
  

$$\rightarrow \left(\frac{c_2}{c_1}\right)^{\sigma \times \frac{1}{\sigma}} = \left(\frac{p_1}{p_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}},$$
  

$$\rightarrow \frac{c_2}{c_1} = \left(\frac{p_1}{p_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}},$$
  

$$\rightarrow c_2 = \left(\frac{p_1}{p_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} c_1.$$

You can use this equation together with the household budget constraint to solve for  $c_1$  and  $c_2$  because  $p_1, p_2, I$  and  $\sigma$  will all be given:

$$p_1c_1 + p_2c_2 = I, (1)$$

$$c_2 = \left(\frac{p_1}{p_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} c_1. \tag{2}$$

Two equations in two unknowns. Solve it for  $c_1^*$  and  $c_2^*$ . Plug the second into the first equation

$$p_1c_1 + p_2 \overbrace{\left[\left(\frac{p_1}{p_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} c_1\right]}^{c_2} = I$$
$$\rightarrow p_1c_1 + p_2 \left(\frac{p_1}{p_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} c_1 = I$$
$$\rightarrow \left(p_1 + p_2 \left(\frac{p_1}{p_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right) c_1 = I$$
$$\rightarrow c_1^* = \frac{I}{\left(p_1 + p_2 \left(\frac{p_1}{p_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right)}.$$

The solve for  $c_2^*$  using equation (2)

### 2 Household Problem with 2 Goods and Taxes

Household preferences are gives as

$$u(c_1, c_2) = \frac{c_1^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \frac{c_2^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$

The budget constraint is

$$p_1c_1 + \overbrace{(1+\tau) \times p_2}^{\bar{p}_2} c_2 = I - T,$$

where  $\tau$  is a proportional tax on good 2 and T is a lump sum tax and income I is exogenously given (endowment income). You could simply treat this as good 2 having a new, higher price now that is defined as

$$\bar{p}_2 := (1+\tau) \, p_2$$

and solve everything with this new price. In these notes I'll keep it separate so that the tax rate appears explicitly. Wherever you had  $p_2$  before you know have  $(1 + \tau) p_2$ .

#### 2.1 Budget Constraint

If you want to draw the budget constraint you can reformulate the budget constraint as

$$c_{2} = \underbrace{\frac{I - T}{(1 + \tau) p_{2}}}_{\text{I} - \tau} - \underbrace{\frac{p_{1}}{p_{1}}}_{(1 + \tau) p_{2}} c_{1}.$$

The extreme consumption points, where the budget constraint crosses the axes are:

$$c_1 = 0 \rightarrow c_2 = \frac{I}{(1+\tau) p_2},$$
  
 $c_2 = 0 \rightarrow c_1 = \frac{I}{p_1}.$ 

Draw this budget constraint with quantities of  $c_1$  on the horizontal axis and quantities of  $c_2$  on the vertical axis.

#### 2.2 Household Maximization Problem

The household maximization problem is:

$$max_{\{c_1,c_2\}} \left\{ \frac{c_1^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \frac{c_2^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} \right\}$$
  
s.t.  
$$p_1c_1 + (1+\tau) p_2c_2 = I - T.$$

The optimality condition of the household is

$$MRS \equiv \frac{MU_{c_1}}{MU_{c_2}} = \frac{p_1}{(1+\tau)\,p_2},$$

where  $MU_{c_1} = \frac{\partial u(c_1,c_2)}{\partial c_1}$  is the marginal utility w.r.t.  $c_1$  and  $MU_{c_2} = \frac{\partial u(c_1,c_2)}{\partial c_2}$ . With the functional form given above the MRS becomes:

$$MU_{c_1} = \frac{\partial u(c_1, c_2)}{\partial c_1} = (1 - \sigma) \frac{c_1^{1 - \sigma - 1}}{(1 - \sigma)} = c_1^{-\sigma},$$
$$MU_{c_2} = \frac{\partial u(c_1, c_2)}{\partial c_2} = (1 - \sigma) \frac{c_2^{1 - \sigma - 1}}{(1 - \sigma)} = c_2^{-\sigma},$$

and

$$MRS = \frac{c_1^{-\sigma}}{c_2^{-\sigma}} = \frac{c_2^{\sigma}}{c_1^{\sigma}} = \left(\frac{c_2}{c_1}\right)^{\sigma}.$$

The optimality condition says that this has to be equal to the price ratio so that

$$\left(\frac{c_2}{c_1}\right)^{\sigma} = \frac{p_1}{\left(1+\tau\right)p_2}.$$

We can now express  $c_2$  as a function of  $c_1$  and prices

$$\begin{pmatrix} \frac{c_2}{c_1} \end{pmatrix}^{\sigma} = \frac{p_1}{(1+\tau) p_2},$$

$$\rightarrow \left( \left(\frac{c_2}{c_1}\right)^{\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \left(\frac{p_1}{(1+\tau) p_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}},$$

$$\rightarrow \left(\frac{c_2}{c_1}\right)^{\sigma \times \frac{1}{\sigma}} = \left(\frac{p_1}{(1+\tau) p_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}},$$

$$\rightarrow \frac{c_2}{c_1} = \left(\frac{p_1}{(1+\tau) p_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}},$$

$$\rightarrow c_2 = \left(\frac{p_1}{(1+\tau) p_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} c_1.$$

You can use this equation together with the household budget constraint to solve for  $c_1$  and  $c_2$  because  $p_1, p_2, I$  and  $\sigma$  will all be given:

$$p_1c_1 + (1+\tau)p_2c_2 = I - T,$$
(3)

$$c_2 = \left(\frac{p_1}{(1+\tau)\,p_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} c_1. \tag{4}$$

Two equations in two unknowns. Solve it for  $c_1^*$  and  $c_2^*$ . Plug the second into the first equation

$$p_{1}c_{1} + (1+\tau)p_{2}\overbrace{\left[\left(\frac{p_{1}}{(1+\tau)p_{2}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}c_{1}\right]}^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} = I - T$$

$$\rightarrow p_{1}c_{1} + (1+\tau)p_{2}\left(\frac{p_{1}}{(1+\tau)p_{2}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}c_{1} = I - T$$

$$\rightarrow \left(p_{1} + (1+\tau)p_{2}\left(\frac{p_{1}}{(1+\tau)p_{2}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right)c_{1} = I - T$$

$$\rightarrow c_{1}^{*} = \frac{I - T}{\left(p_{1} + (1+\tau)p_{2}\left(\frac{p_{1}}{(1+\tau)p_{2}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right)}.$$

The solve for  $c_2^*$  using equation (4).

# 3 Household Problem with Consumption and Leisure and Taxes

Household preferences are gives as

$$u(c,\ell) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \frac{\ell^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$

The budget constraint is

$$c = \overbrace{(1-\tau) \times (h-\ell) \times w}^{\text{after tax income}} - T$$

where  $\tau$  is a proportional tax on labor income and T is a lump sum tax. We could reformulate this as

$$p_1c + \overbrace{(1-\tau) \times w\ell}^{p_2} = \overbrace{(1-\tau) hw}^{I} - T,$$

in which case it would look identical to the earlier problem. Note that  $(1 - \tau) w$  is the price of leisure. However, I will keep it as is and solve with the new notation.

#### 3.1 Budget Constraint

If you want to draw the budget constraint you can reformulate the budget constraint as

$$c = \underbrace{(1-\tau)}^{\text{intercept}} \underbrace{wh - T - (1-\tau)}_{wh - T - (1-\tau)} w \times \ell.$$

The extreme consumption points, where the budget constraint crosses the axes are:

$$c = 0 \rightarrow \ell = \frac{(1-\tau)wh - T}{(1-\tau)w},$$
$$\ell = 0 \rightarrow c = (1-\tau)wh - T.$$

Draw this budget constraint with quantities of c on the horizontal axis and quantities of  $\ell$  on the vertical axis.

#### 3.2 Household Maximization Problem

The household maximization problem is:

$$\max_{\{c,\ell\}} \left\{ \frac{c^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \frac{\ell^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} \right\}$$
  
s.t.  
$$c = (1-\tau) (h-\ell) w - T.$$

The optimality condition of the household is MRS equal to the price ratio or:

$$MRS \equiv \frac{MU_c}{MU_l} = \frac{1}{(1-\tau)w},$$

where  $MU_c = \frac{\partial u(c,\ell)}{\partial c}$  is the marginal utility w.r.t. c and  $MU_\ell = \frac{\partial u(c,\ell)}{\partial \ell}$ . With the functional form given above the MRS becomes:

$$MU_c = \frac{\partial u(c,\ell)}{\partial c} = (1-\sigma) \frac{c_1^{1-\sigma-1}}{(1-\sigma)} = c^{-\sigma},$$
$$MU_\ell = \frac{\partial u(c,\ell)}{\partial \ell} = (1-\sigma) \frac{\ell^{1-\sigma-1}}{(1-\sigma)} = \ell^{-\sigma},$$

 $\quad \text{and} \quad$ 

$$MRS = \frac{MU_c}{MU_\ell} = \frac{c^{-\sigma}}{\ell^{-\sigma}} = \frac{\ell^{\sigma}}{c_1^{\sigma}} = \left(\frac{\ell}{c}\right)^{\sigma}.$$

The optimality condition says that this has to be equal to the price ratio so that

$$\left(\frac{\ell}{c}\right)^{\sigma} = \frac{1}{\left(1 - \tau\right)w}.$$

We can now express  $\ell$  as a function of  $c {\rm and}$  prices

$$\begin{pmatrix} \frac{\ell}{c} \end{pmatrix}^{\sigma} = \frac{1}{(1-\tau)w},$$

$$\rightarrow \left( \left(\frac{\ell}{c}\right)^{\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \left(\frac{1}{(1-\tau)w}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}},$$

$$\rightarrow \left(\frac{\ell}{c}\right)^{\sigma \times \frac{1}{\sigma}} = \left(\frac{1}{(1-\tau)w}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}},$$

$$\rightarrow \frac{\ell}{c} = \left(\frac{1}{(1-\tau)w}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}},$$

$$\rightarrow \ell = \left(\frac{1}{(1-\tau)w}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}c.$$

You can use this equation together with the household budget constraint to solve for cand  $\ell$  because w, h and  $\sigma$  will all be given:

$$c + (1 - \tau) w \ell = (1 - \tau) h w - T,$$
(5)

$$\ell = \left(\frac{1}{\left(1-\tau\right)w}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}c.$$
(6)

Two equations in two unknowns. Solve it for  $c^*$  and  $\ell^*$ . Plug the second into the first equation

$$c + (1 - \tau) w \left[ \left( \frac{1}{(1 - \tau) w} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} c \right] = (1 - \tau) hw - T$$

$$\rightarrow c + (1 - \tau) w \left( \frac{1}{(1 - \tau) w} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} c = (1 - \tau) hw - T$$

$$\rightarrow \left( 1 + (1 - \tau) w \left( \frac{1}{(1 - \tau) w} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \right) c = (1 - \tau) hw - T$$

$$\rightarrow c_1^* = \frac{(1 - \tau) hw - T}{\left( 1 + (1 - \tau) w \left( \frac{1}{(1 - \tau) w} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \right)}.$$

The solve for  $\ell$  using equation (6).

# 4 References

# References